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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-DEFINING THE CIA's "INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES" AS AN EXEMPTION TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT-CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).

"A Democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate,
and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and qual
ity of its information varies. A danger signal to our democratic soci
ety in the United States is the fact that such a political truism needs
repeating." 1
INTRODUCTION
In CIA v. Sims,2 the United States Supreme Court sharply limited
the public availability of information held by the Central Intelligence
Agency (hereinafter CIA) and permitted the CIA to withhold virtu
ally any information 3 which the Agency obtains pursuant to its intelli
gence gathering function, despite the broad disclosure requirements of
the Freedom of Information Act4 (hereinafter FOIA).
1. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2418,2429 (from the concluding paragraph of the legislative history of the
Freedom of Information Act).
2. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
3. The lower courts have used Sims to uphold the non-disclosure of information by
the CIA. Villanueva v. United States Dep't of Justice, 782 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 1986)
(The court applied the Sims mandate of limited disclosure to a request for personnel files
from the FBI.); United States Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620 F. Supp. 565,570 (D.D.C. 1985)
(The court applied the Sims definition of "intelligence sources" to a request for information
made to the CIA under section (b)(3) thereby permitting the CIA to withhold the re
quested information.).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). To gain access to material held by a government agency,
one must make a written request to the agency. The request must "reasonably describe
[the] records" sought and the request must be "made in accordance with published rules
stating the time, place, fees, (if any) and procedure to be followed ...." 5 U.S.C. § 552
(a)(3)(A) & (B) (1982). If the request is in conformity with the rules, and the information
requested does not fall under one of the nine exemptions, the agency must release the mate
rial. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975). If after reviewing the requested
information, the government agency refuses to disclose the information, the requester has
the right of appeal to a federal district court. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (4)(B) (1982).
In reviewing an agency refusal to disclose information, the court must follow certain
procedures. Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937
(1980). The court in Hayden stated that the procedure to be utilized by the trial court in
FOIA cases is as follows:
(1) The trial court must make a de novo review of the agency's classification deci
sion, with the burden on the agency to justify nondisclosure. (2) In conducting
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In 1977, John Sims and Sidney Wolfe filed a request with the CIA
in which they sought specific information about the Agency's MKUL
TRA experiments. s Between 1953 and 1966, the MKULTRA project
was part of a series of mind-altering drug experiments conducted by
the U.S. government. 6 MKULTRA was the principal program for
CIA development of chemical and biological agents which were to be
"capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human
behavior."7 While the CIA intended to use the drugs developed in the
project to assist in interrogations of foreign agents, 8 the Agency also
used MKULTRA/MKDELTA drugs overseas for "harassment, dis
crediting, ... and disabling purposes."9 Some of the MKULTRA ex
periments themselves led to tragic results, including the death of one
researcher. 10
this review, the court is to give 'substantial weight' to the affidavits from the
agency. (3) The court is to require the agency to create as full a public record as
possible, concerning the nature of the documents and the justification for nondis
closure. (4) If step (3) does not create a sufficient basis for making a decision, the
court may accept classified affidavits in camera, or it may inspect the documents
in camera. This step is at the court's discretion, with certain guidelines discussed
below. (5) The court should require release of reasonably segregable parts of doc
uments that do not fall within the FOIA exemptions.
Id. at 1384 (footnote omitted).
5. Sims, 471 U.S. at 162-63. The information that Sims and Wolfe requested con
cerned: "(I) the names of universities and other institutions that received funding from the
[CIA] for the so-called MKULTRA program as well as the names of the principal re
searchers at each institution; and (2) the grant proposals and contracts awarded under the
MKULTRA program." Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 84 (D.D.C. 1979).
6. The mind control experiments were: CHATTER, which ran from 1947-1953;
BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, which ran from 1950-1956; MKNAOMI, which ran from
1952-1970; MKULTRA, which ran from 1953-1966; and MKDELTA, which was estab
lished to govern MKULTRA abroad. FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, FINAL
REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Book I,
387-92 (1976) [hereinafter FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE]. For a discussion of
the project generally, see Human Drug Testing by the CIA, 1977: Hearings before the Sub
comm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Project MKULTRA, The CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral
Modification: Joint Hearings before the Select Comm. on Intelligence and the Subcomm. on
Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) [hereinafter Hearings on Project MKULTRA].
7. FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, supra note 6, at 389.
8. Id. at 391.
9. Id. See also 131 CONGo REC. Sll,008 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum). The Senator noted that the CIA conducted experiments on "unwitting Ca
nadian citizens" and that he was "aghast at the refusal of the U.S. Government to resolve .
. . [the] matter." Id.
to. In 1953, at a conference run by CIA personnel, Dr. Frank Olsen unwittingly
received 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau. Dr. Robert Lashbrook, a "CIA
Officer," had intentionally placed the drug there. After the administration of the LSD,
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Sims and Wolfe sought information from the CIA concerning
grant proposals and contracts for the MKULTRA project, which the
CIA released, II and the names of the researchers and their affiliated
institutions, which the CIA did not release, invoking section (b)(3) of
the FOIA.12
The Court in Sims held that researchers involved in the CIA's
MKULTRA project were confidential "intelligence sources" under
the National Security Act of 1947 13 (hereinafter National Security
Act), and thus exempt from disclosure under a specific exemption, sec
tion (b)(3) of the FOIA.14 The Court interpreted the statutory term,
"intelligence source," to mean a person who "provides, or is engaged
to provide information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obliga
tions."Is Since the Court's interpretation encompasses virtually all in
formation sources utilized by the CIA, it could allow that agency to
withhold information gathered from such innocuous sources as "news
papers ... public libraries, road maps and telephone books."16
This note assesses whether, in light of the limited congressional
guidance and conflicting purposes governing information disclosure in
the national security area, the decision in Sims was an appropriate
interpretation of the statute. Part I of this note discusses the back
ground, structure and text of the FOIA and the CIA's organic stat
utes. It includes an analysis of the FOIA's purposes as revealed by its
legislative history and the exemptions created by Congress that would
justify the withholding of information in the national security area.
Olsen exhibited symptoms of paranoia and schizophrenia. Olsen, accompanied by Lash
brook, went to New York City for treatment. While in New York, Olsen jumped to his
death from a tenth story window in the Statler Hotel, where he was staying. FOREIGN AND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, supra note 6, at 394.
11. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 85 (D.D.C. 1979).
12. Id.
13. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1982). For text, see infra note 49.
14. Sims, ~71 U.S. at 173.
15. Id. at 177. Characterizing the MKULTRA researchers as "intelligence sources"
authorizes the Director of the CIA to keep confidential the names of the researchers and
the institutions with which they are affiliated. See 50 U.S.c. § 403(d)(3). Moreover, the
names of persons designated as "intelligence sources" under the National Security Act are
excluded from the scope of the FOIA section (b)(3) which exempts from disclosure any
information deemed confidential by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) (1982). For the full text
of the section, see infra note 26.
16. Sims, 471 U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d
562 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Markey, c.J., dissenting), in which Chief Judge Markey, comment
ing on the Agency's definition of "intelligence sources" which was adopted by the Supreme
Court, stated: "The Agency's definition effectively reads 'intelligence source' as 'informa
tion source,' requiring protection of all sources of all information 'rationally related' to
national security. As the majority opinion makes clear, that sucks into secrecy's maw too
many sources of too many kinds of information." Id. at 576 (footnote omitted).
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This section also examines the role of the CIA's organic statutes in the
FOIA process. Part II presents the background of CIA v. Sims and
discusses the two Court decisions issued in this case. 17 Part III ana
lyzes the majority Court's definition of "intelligence source" and criti
cizes the appropriateness of that definition in light of the facts in Sims
and the congressional intent behind the enactment of section (b)(I) of
the FOIA. The note discusses the concurring opinion, and its defini
tion of "intelligence sources." Part IV analyzes the Court's failure to
give the proper weight to section (b)(1) of the FOIA. Part V discusses
the institutional conflict resulting from the Court's decision and con
cludes by proposing an amendment to the CIA Act to clarify the term
"intelligence source."
I.

A.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Freedom of Information Act

While concern for an effective information disclosure act was ex
pressed as early as 1953,18 it was not until July 4, 1966, that President
Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Freedom of Information
Act. 19 President Johnson signed the FOIA hesitantly,20 remarking
that "this bill in no way impairs the President's power under our Con
stitution to provide for confidentiality when the national interest so
requires."21 This statement foreshadowed the nature of the continuing
debate which would span the next two decades, reflecting the compet
17. Sims, 471 U.S. 159; Sims, 471 U.S. at 181 (Marshall, J., concurring).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2418,2419. The House Report states that this first intention was evidenced
by Dr. Harold L. Cross in 1953 in a report he prepared for the American Society of News
paper Editors, which was "the first comprehensive study of [the] growing restrictions on
the peoples's right to know the facts of government." Id. The House Report went on to say
that, in his study:
Dr. Cross outlined three areas where, through legislative inaction, the weed of
improper secrecy had been permitted to blossom and was choking out the basic
right to know: the 'housekeeping' statute which gives Government officials gen
eral authority to operate their agencies, the 'executive privilege' concept which
affects legislative access to executive branch information, and section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act which affects public access to the rules and regula
tions of Government action.
Id. For Dr. Cross' critique of the Administrative Procedure Act, see H. CROSS, THE PUB
LIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 223-28 (1953).
19. The bill signed into law was S. 1160. The legislation passed on a vote of 308 for,
o opposed and 125 not voting. Smith, The Freedom ofInformation Act of1966: A Legisla
tive History Analysis, 74 LAW LIBR. J. 231, 278 (1981). For a full discussion of legislation
leading up to the adoptment of the FOIA, see id. at 260-78.
20. J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 2.04 (1985).
21. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information Pro
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ing concerns of disclosure and confidentiality and the executive
branch's commitment to protecting what it regards as information
within the "national interest. "22
Congress enacted the FOIA because the previous vehicle for dis
closing government held information, section three of the Administra
tive Procedure Act,23 had "been used as an authority for withholding,
rather than disclosing, information."24 The drafters of the FOIA in
tended that the act serve as a "true Federal public records Act" and
that public information be readily available. 25 At the same time, the
drafters did not propose, and Congress did not adopt, a statutory re
quirement of complete disclosure. From the beginning, the FOIA has
had nine exemptions,26 authorizing the non-disclosure of information
vision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 2 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 895 (July 4,
1966).
22. See J. O'REILLY, supra note 20, at § 2.04 ("At the time of passage, the Justice
Department and other observers believed that the scope of executive privilege exceeded the
scope of the Freedom of Information Act and that deficiencies in the protection which
government documents might enjoy under the Act could be made up by claims of executive
privilege for those materials.").
23. 5 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1947).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2421.
25. Id., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2418.
26. The text of the FOIA concerning the nine exemptions is as follows
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are
(l)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of
this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or
(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per
son and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to
the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforce
ment proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
(D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record com
piled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investi
gation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source,
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ranging from trade secrets27 to geological and geophysical data. 28
This note examines the FOIA provisions which address the na
tional security and statutory exemptions from the disclosure require
ments; sections (b)(l) and (b)(3). The note contrasts the areas where
Congress has expressly limited the information that can be released by
administrative agencies under the FOIA provisions, and areas where
Congress has been, for all intents and purposes, silent. Against this
background, the note explores the consequences of this Congressional
imprecision so well demonstrated in Sims.
Section (b)(l) of the FOIA exempts national security information
classified pursuant to an executive order. 29 In the legislative history of
this section of the Act, the drafters stated that information classified in
such a manner "must be kept secret to protect the national defense or
to advance foreign policy .... "30 The applicable executive order31
creates three levels of classification-Top Secret; Secret; and Confiden
tiaJ.32 Section (b)(l) would exempt material classified under anyone
(E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or
physical safety of law enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports pre
pared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern
ing welIs.
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shalI be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this
subsection.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I)-(9) (1982). See generally Note, The Freedom ofInformation Act-The
Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 GEO. L.J. 177 (1973) (detailed discussion of the nine
exemptions).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9).
29. The drafters of the Act specificalIy cited Executive Order 10,501. The order,
signed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on November 10, 1953, listed three categories
for the classification of information. These were: Top Secret, Secret and Confidential. The
classification Top Secret was intended to be used "for defense information or material
which requires the highest degree of protection." For the classification of Secret, it was
considered that "defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which
could result in serious damage to the Nation" should be withheld. Lastly, in order for
something to be classified as Confidential, it must be "defense information or material the
unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense interest of the nation."
Exec. Order 10,501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049, 7051 (1953).
30. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2427 (emphasis added).
31. Exec. Order 12,065,43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978). Sims V. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84,
88 (D.D.C. 1979). To determine the relevant executive order, the court should consider the
final executive order "under which the agency made its ultimate classification determina
tion." Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
32. Exec. Order 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949-50. Section 1-102 of the order stated,
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of these categories. 33
The second relevant exemption, section (b)(3), authorizes non
disclosure of material "specifically exempted from disclosure by stat
ute ...."34 Thus, if Congress in a specific statute has required a fed
eral agency to withhold certain information, the general language of
the FOIA cannot be used to compel disclosure. 35 Section (b)(3) recog
nizes two types of statutes as qualifying for this exemption: those that
"leave [the agency] no discretion on the issue" of public disclosure or
those that establish "particular criteria for withholding" informa
tion. 36 Section (b)(3) is the section the CIA relies on most as a bar to
the disclosure of sensitive information-requested by members of the
public. 37
Congress has amended the FOIA on two occasions. Both amend
ments were congressional reactions to Supreme Court decisions nar
rowing the scope of the Act,38 and both have broadened the scope of
information available to the public .
.. 'Top Secret' shall be applied only to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national secur
ity." Section 1-103 states, .. 'Secret' shall be applied only to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security."
Section 1-104 states, .. 'Confidential' shall be applied to information, the unauthorized dis
closure of which reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national
security." Id.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(I) (1982).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) (1982).
35. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 181 (1985).
36. These recognitions are made by subsections (A) and (B) respectively. For a dis
cussion on how subsections A and B were added to section three, see American Jewish
Congress v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
37. In the following cases the court upheld the CIA's use of section (b)(3) to prevent
the disclosure of sensitive national security information. Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Goland v. CIA, 607
F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), certdenied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Nat'1 Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Social Justice v. CIA, 565 F.2d
692 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
38. The two Supreme Court decisions were: EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) and
Robertson v. FAA, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
In the House Report on the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, the drafters, commenting
on Mink, stated:
A recent Supreme Court decision held that under the present language of the Act,
the content of documents withheld under section 552(b)(I)-pertaining to na
tional defense or foreign policy information-is not reviewable by the courts
under the de novo requirement in section 552(a)(3). The Court decided that the
limit of judicial inquiry is the determination whether or not the information was,
in fact, marked with a classification under specific requirements of an Executive
order, and that this determination was satisfied by an affidavit from the agency
controlling the information. In camera inspection of the documents by the Court
to determine if the information actually falls within the criteria of the Executive
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In 1974, Congress broadened the definition of "agency" to bring
more governmental bodies within the FOIA disclosure mandate. 39 In
1976, Congress limited the number of administrative statutes falling
under section (b)(3).40 While not "undertak[ing] to sort out those
nondisclosure statutes that it comprehended as ... [falling] within the
exemption from those that it intended to exclude,"41 Congress made
clear that exemptions to the FOIA should be interpreted narrowly.42
A better "balance" between the public's right to free access to
information and the CIA's need for secrecy was proposed in a 1981
FOIA amendment. 43 Drafted by the Department of Justice on behalf
of the CIA,44 the bill would have restricted the type of information the
Director of the CIA was required to release under the FOIA.45 Yet
even under that bill, the Director of CIA could not withhold informa
tion concerning utilization of "scientific or technical systems for the
collection of intelligence [which dealt with] research programs which
involve experimentation with or risk to the health or safety of human
beings."46 Even when the CIA was seeking specific legislation to miniorder was specifically rejected by the Court in its interpretation of section
552(b)(I) of the Act.
H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS 6267, 6272-73 (footnote omitted).
The legislative history went on to say: "Two amendments to the Act included in this
bill are aimed at increasing the authority of the courts to engage in a full review of agency
actions." Id. at 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 6273.
In the House Report on the 1976 Government in the Sunshine Act, the drafters stated:
"Robertson held that exemption (3) ... included within its ambit ... the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 ... which allows the FAA Administrator to withhold from the public any
FAA material when he believes that a 'disclosure of such information ... is not required in
the interest of the public.''' H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2183, 2205. The drafters concluded that the Court's
decision "misconceives the intent of exemption (3)" and that only specific statutes should
fall under section (b)(3). Id.
39. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 6267, 6274.
40. H.R. REP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 2183, 2205.
41. American Jewish Congress V. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Con
gress instead left such distinctions up to the judiciary. Id.
42. Id. at 630; Seymour V. Barabba, 559 F.2d 806, 807-09 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
43. The Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency Exemptions:
Hearings on H.R. 5129. H.R. 7055 and H.R. 7056. before a Subcomm. ofthe House Comm.
on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) [hereinafter The Freedom ofInfor
mation Act Hearings].
44. See H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, 7, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3741, 3745.
45. The Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, P.L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat.
2209 (1984).
46. The Freedom of Information Act Hearings. supra note 43, at 16.
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mize Agency disclosure requirements, it did not suggest restricting
public access to information about research programs like
MKULTRA.47
B.

The CIA's Organic Statutes

Of the more than 135 statutes which qualify as statutes requiring
non-disclosure under section (b)(3),48 the two statutes primarily used
by the CIA to withhold information are the National Security Act49
and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 194950 (hereinafter CIA
Act). Considered the CIA's "organic" statutes,51 both acts instruct
the Director of the CIA to protect "intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. "52 Thus, the meaning of "~ntelligence
sources" is critical to the scope of the CIA's competing duties of pro
tection of sources and of public information disclosure.
Courts have searched fruitlessly for a clear indication of the defi
nition of "intelligence source."53 Resorting to the legislative histories
of the National Security Act and the CIA Act has proved unsatisfying,
for the sparse record reveals little of Congress' intended meaning of
the term. 54 Two conclusions do emerge clearly, however. The first is
47. Id.
The Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1046-54 (1985) [hereinafter
The Freedom of Information Reform Act Hearings] (quoting THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
48.

ACCESS PROFESSIONALS, THE (B)(3) PROJECT: QTATIONS BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 5-13
(1984».
49. 50 U.S.c. § 403(d)(3) (1982), which states: "[T]he Director of Central Intelli
gence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthor
ized disclosure . . .."
50. 50 U.S.c. § 403g (1982), which states: "[T]he Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis
closure, the Agency shall be exempted from ... the provisions of any other law which
require[s] the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles,
salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency ...."
51. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
52. See supra notes 49-50. The "intelligence sources and methods" language is pre
sumed to have the same meaning in both acts. An example of this can be found in Over
street v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943). In Overstreet the language, "engaged in
commerce," used in two similar statutes, was interpreted to have the same meaning. Id. at
131-32.
53. In the following cases courts have had great difficulty over how to apply and
define "intelligence sources." Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d llOO, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F. SUpp. 704
(D.D.C. 1983); Shaw v. United States Dep't of State, 559 F. SUpp. 1053 (D.D.C. 1983);
Edwards v. CIA, 512 F. SUpp. 689 (D.D.C. 1981).
54. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2418, 2424-25. See also O'REILLY, supra note 20, at § 13.02; M.
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that the drafters of the FOIA did intend the National Security Act
and the CIA Act to fall under section (b)(3).55 The second is that the
CIA Act established the parameters within which Congress expected
the CIA to act. 56
HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, Top SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO
KNOW (1977), which states:
The exemption for national defense and foreign policy information received very
little attention during the hearings and debate on the act. Opposition to the
whole idea of a Freedom of Information Act was universal within the executive
branch, and since abuses in the secrecy system had not yet come to light, public
concern was minimal.
Id. at 47. See also Admiral Redman May Have Been a Navy Villain, but He Deserves a CIA
Medal and a Supreme Court Apology, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE LITERARY SCENE, Dec.
1985, at 1. The article notes the absence of any clear legislative history concerning the
meaning of "intelligence source," that the CIA was established as a solely external intelli
gence gathering organization, and that Chief Justice Burger's conclusion of the plain mean
ing of the Act was erroneous. The article concludes:
Knowing no history and reading only words, the Supreme Court came up
with a theoretically plausible but historically untenable view of "sources and
methods." What the Court would have us believe is that an alert, all-seeing Con
gress, worried about our intelligence secrets, gave CIA, entrusted CIA, helped
CIA and vested in CIA what CIA needed to carry out its mission, namely, virtu
ally unlimited power to protect all sources, no matter how commonplace and
public .... What the Court failed to appreciate is that neither General Donovan,
[Head of the Office of Strategic Services in 1944] nor any OSS official, nor any
other official ever thought the agency needed such a weapon or sought it. What
the Court failed to learn is that the phrase came from a person, an institution, and
a body of people who simply did not want a CIA but who wanted to make sure
that if such a dreaded thing came to be that at least it would be subject to a "legal
compulsion to adhere to a sound [comint] security policy." It was imposed on
CIA.
Id. at 7.
55. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168 (1985). See also Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d
692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). In both cases, the courts held that the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 and the National Security Act of 1947 were statutes that the drafters
of the FOIA contemplated as falling under section (b)(3). The court in Weissman stated
that: "the legislative history clearly demonstrates that both § 403(d)(3) [National Security
Agency Act] and § 403(g) [Central Intelligence Agency Act] are precisely the type of stat
utes comprehended by exemption (b)(3)." Weissman, 565 F.2d at 694.
56. The first indication of the establishment of a CIA was evidenced in a Presidential
Directive, Jan. 22, 1946, issued by President Harry S. Truman, 11 Fed. Reg. 1337 (1946),
which stated that the purpose of the Agency was to "[a]ccomplish the correlation and
evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemina
tion within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence." Id.
The directive went on to state: "Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the
making of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States ...." Id. at 1339
(emphasis added). Finally, for the first time, the Directive stated the "intelligence sources
and methods" language that would later be incorporated into § 403(3) and at issue in Sims.
"In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence Agency and the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and meth·
ods." Id. (emphasis added).
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The drafters of the CIA Act desired that the intelligence gather
ing process should occur outside of the United States 57 and that the
identities of agents operating in other countries should be protected. 58
Congress was also concerned with the danger presented by powerful,
domestic centralized intelligence organizations. 59 The CIA Act was
Congress' attempt to address the dual concerns of protecting the confi
dentiality of worldwide intelligence gathering operations60 and of
preventing "the establishment of a Gestapo in the United States
...."61 The drafters envisioned a CIA operating outside of the United
States and using trained, professional operatives. 62 Extrapolating
these parameters to the definition of "intelligence sources," one can
infer that the term refers to covert CIA operatives working in foreign
countries.
C.

The CIA Act of 1984

Congress has taken only limited action to define further the ap
propriate balance between national security and information disclo
sure. Although the FOIA broadened general information disclosure
to the public,63 it did not necessarily broaden the amount of informa
tion obtainable from the CIA under its organic statutes. In fact, Con
gress has narrowed what may be gathered from the CIA via the
FOIA.64
57. Commenting on the CIA Act, Senator Tydings stated: "The bill relates entirely
to matters external to the United States; it has nothing to do with internal America. It
relates to the gathering of facts and information beyond the borders of the United States. It
has no application to the domestic scene in any manner, shape, or form." 95 CONGo REC.
6947 (1949) (statement of Sen. Tydings).
58. Senator Tydings, speaking of three Americans killed in intelligence gathering
stated: "What the ... [CIA Act of 1949] does is to seek to keep ... [the names and
identities of operatives] out of the normal accounting channels, so that they cannot be
picked up through the promiscuous dissemination of information. That is the principle
point of the bill." Id. at 4240 (statement of Sen. Tydings).
59. Senator Langer, in the hearing on the CIA Act of 1949, expressed the view that
the drafters were "against the establishment of a Gestapo in the United States by which
people may be hounded and harassed by a central bureau, or by anyone else." Id. at 6952
(statement of Sen. Langer).
60. See supra note 58.
61. See supra note 59.
62. Senator Tydings, discussing the nature of the proposed CIA Act and the people
who would work as agents, stated: "All these men work outside the United States of
America, and the bill so provides. They cannot work in the United States of America.
Their functions are exclusively in foreign fields, and they are gathering, by close examina
tion, information which it is deemed necessary for our country to have ...." 95 CONGo
REC. 6954 (1949) (statement of Sen. Tydings).
63. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
64. See infra note 71.
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In 1980, 1981, 1983, and 1984,65 Congress considered legislation
affecting either the CIA Act or the National Security Act. The first
three attempts were not enacted into legislation. The most recent ef
fort, however, the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act of
198466 (hereinafter CIA Act of 1984), was signed into law on October
15, 1984. 67 On that occasion, President Reagan remarked that the law
"assures the public of continued access to information that is releas
able."68 The House Report on the bill69 stressed the importance of the
FOIA in maintaining faith in the government and particularly in the
CIA.70
One of the primary purposes of the CIA Act of 1984 was to re
lease the CIA from the burden of answering frivolous FOIA re
quests. 7l The goal was to protect "individual agents and intelligence
65. National Intelligence Act of 1980, S. 2284: Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); National Intelligence Act of1980, H.R.
7668: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Legislation ofthe Permanent House Select Comm.
on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); The Intelligence Reform Act of 1981: Hearings
before the Senate Select Intelligence Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For Congres
sional action in 1983 and 1984, see infra note 67.
66. The Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, P.L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat.
2209 (1984). The Act has been codified as 50 U.S.C. §§ 431-32 (Supp. II 1984).
67. 20 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1543 (Oct. 15, 1984). Briefly, the legislative
background of the CIA Act of 1984 is as follows: First, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence held hearings on June 21,28 and October 4, 1983. S. 1324, An Amendment to
the National Security Act of 1947: Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983). The Committee made public a report on November 9, 1983.
S. REP. No. 305, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983). After debating the bill, the Senate passed the
Act on November 17, 1983. 129 CONGo REC. SI6,742-46 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983). In the
second stage of the bill, the House version, the Subcommittee on Intelligence held its hear
ings on February 8, 1984, and issued its report on May 1, 1984. H.R. REp. No. 726, pt. 1,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE AND CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3741.
Also, the Government Information, Justice and Agriculture Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations held its hearing on May 10, 1984 and released a
report on September 10, 1984. H.R. REP. No. 726, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3778. On September 19, 1984, the House de
bated and passed its version of the CIA Act of 1984, H.R. 5164,130 CONGo REC. S12,395
97 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1984).
68. Statement on Signing H.R. 5164 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1543
(Oct. 15, 1984).
69. H.R. REP. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3741.
70. "The Agency's acceptance of the obligation under the FOIA to provide informa
tion to the public not exempted under the FOIA is one of the linchpins of this legislation.
The Act has played a vital part in maintaining the American people's faith in their govern
ment, and particularly in agencies like the CIA that must necessarily operate in secrecy."
Id. at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3747.
71. The House Report stated that the purposes of the bill were:
(I) to relieve the Central Intelligence Agency from an unproductive Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requirement to search and review certain CIA opera
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services of friendly nations"72 by "excluding certain specifically de
fined sensitive CIA operational files from the Freedom of Information
Act process."73 Thus, the most prominent subsection of the Act ex
empted from the FOIA most of the CIA's operational files. 74 The sub
section listed the four directorates of the CIA whose operational files
are exempt: Intelligence, Administrative, Operations, and Science and
Technology.75 The legislative history of the Act specifically stated
that "only those files concerning intelligence sources and methods are
comprehended by the definition of 'operational files.' "76
The Congressional debate over the scope of the CIA Act of 1984
reflected concern for the physical safety of intelligence operatives and
the potential danger which disclosure might create. 77 Concerns for
tional files consisting of records which, after line-by-line security review, almost
invariably prove not to be releasable under the FOIA;
(2) to improve the ability of the Central Intelligence Agency to respond to Free
dom ofInformation Act requests from the public in a timely and efficient manner,
while preserving undiminished the amount of meaningful information releasable
to the public under the Freedom of Information Act; and
(3) to provide additional assurance of confidentiality to sources who assist the
United States by cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency.
Id. at 4, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3742.
72. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3754.
73. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3742.
74. .Operational files are defined in the following manner:
For the purposes of this title the term "operational files" means
(1) files of the Directorate of Operations which document the conduct of foreign
intelligence or security liaison arrangements or information exchanges with for
eign governments or their intelligence or counterintelligence operations or ...
security services;
(2) files of the Directorate for Science and Technology which document the
means by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected through
scientific and technical systems; and
(3) files of the Office of Security which document investigations conducted to
determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
sources; except that files which are the sole repository of disseminated intelligence
are not operational files.
50 U.S.C. § 431(b) (Supp. II 1984).
75. Id.
76. H.R. REp. No. 726, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS at 3758.
77. In a House debate over the scope of the CIA Act of 1984, Congressman Young
stated that the intent of the bill was to reassure intelligence sources that their identities
would be kept confidential. 130 CONGo REC. H9625 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Young). Young discussed how an intelligence source "places his life and livelihood in
the hands of the CIA when he agrees to serve as a source of information ... for the U.S.
Government." Id. In his address, Congressman Young said: "We must reassure CIA
sources abroad who cooperate with the CIA that the United States can keep secrets. This
bill will send a message to CIA sources that they are safe in trusting the United States." Id.
Thus, Congress enacted the CIA Act of 1984 to aid CIA intelligence gathering opera
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safety which are legitimate in the context of overseas operations, how
ever, do not transfer directly to the different setting of CIA-employed
scientists in domestic institutions. A weighing of the harm caused by
disclosure versus the public interest in access to government held in
formation may produce a different result depending on the activity
involved and the location of that activity. Congress has not addressed
these differences explicitly, however-not in the FOIA, the National
Security Act, the CIA Act, or the CIA Act of 1984. Thus, the
Supreme Court in Sims had to devise its own balancing test when it
reached the conclusion that the names of the researchers and institu
tions involved should not be disclosed.
II.
A.

THE DECISIONS IN

CIA

V. SIMS

District Court Decision

After the CIA denied their request for information concerning
the names of researchers in the MKULTRA project,78 the requesters,
exercising their rights under the FOIA, sought review of the CIA's
decision in the United States District Court for the District of Colum
bia. 79 The district court held that because the institutions and re
searchers were not "intelligence sources," as defined by the National
Security Act, their names were not exempt from disclosure under sec
tion (b)(3) of the FOIA and must be released to those seeking the
information. 80
The court gave three reasons for its conclusion. First, it noted
that "this Court cannot look to detailed agency affidavits that describe
MK-ULTRA activities and thereby assure itself that the MK-ULTRA
projects involved intelligence-related work."81 Second, the court
noted that because details were sketchy there were no hard facts to
support the conclusion that the parties involved really did constitute
"intelligence sources" and that it was "apparent from the face of the
Director's [Stansfield Turner of the CIA] affidavit that his definition of
the institutions and researchers as intelligence sources is not well tied
tions by assuring those sources who are potentially in danger that their safety would not be
compromised by public disclosure of their identities.
78. For a discussion of the MKULTRA project, see supra notes 6-10 and accompa
nying text.
79. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1979).
80. Id. at 87-88 ("[In order for the Director of the CIA to have researchers declared]
'intelligence sources' ... [there must be] a strong and detailed showing of the work done
under the auspices of MK-ULTRA or ... by the identification of clear, non-discretionary
guidelines to test whether an intelligence source is involved in a particular case.").
81. Id. at 87.
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to particular facts and is 'potentially quite expansive.' "82 The court
further reasoned that "[t]his definition is susceptible to discretionary
application and overbroad interpretation. "83 Third, the court noted
that the "intelligence sources" whose identity the CIA wanted to pro
tect, represented a "case on the margin" for qualification under section
(b)(3).84 The court found it significant that these were not "CIA oper
atives, couriers who transport secret materials, etc. [but were mainly
Americans conducting research at] American universities, with the
witting or unwitting participation of American students, for a purpose
which may be collateral to the main business of intelligence."85 The
court concluded that it could not endorse the CIA's contention that
the parties involved were "intelligence sources ... without a strong
and detailed showing of the work done under the auspices of MK
ULTRA or, if that does not make it obvious that intelligence sources
are involved, by the identification of clear, non-discretionary guide
lines to test whether an intelligence source is involved in a particular
case." 86 Finally the court suggested that while the names of the re
searchers were not classified under section (b)(3), they possibly could
be classified under sections (b)(1) or (6), and delayed the effective date
of its order for nearly two months to permit the Agency to consider
reclassification.87
B.

Court of Appeals Decision-Sims 1

The CIA appealed the district court's decision to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. 88 Recognizing that the meaning
of the term "intelligence source" was "ambiguous,"89 the court held
that the definition of the term should focus on the source's need for
confidentiality.90 The court looked to Congress for guidance and de
cided that "[i]n chartering the CIA Congress set out, not to protect
82.

Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88-89. The court held that normally it would not hesitate to apply section
(b)(3) to CIA identified "intelligence sources" such as "CIA operatives, couriers who trans
port secret materials, etc." Id. at 87, in this present case the sources in question did not fall
into the above categories, and therefore, should not be exempt. Id. The court, however,
did allow the Agency to consider classification under section (b)(I). The court even set
forward the effective date of the order to October I, 1979. Id. at 88. The court made its
decision on August 7, 1979, and amended on August 13, 1979. Id. at 84.
88. Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
89. Id. at 570.
90. Id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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secrecy as an end in itself, but to provide for effective collection and
analysis of foreign intelligence pertinent to concerns of national secur
ity."91 Concluding that "[a]nalysis should therefore focus on the prac
tical necessity of secrecY,"92 the court defined "intelligence source" to
mean "a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been
engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency
needs to perform its intelligence functions effectively, yet could not
reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of
those who provide it."93
Applying its definition to the case, the court of appeals remanded
it to the district court to apply the new definition of "intelligence
source" to the MKULTRA researchers.
C.

District Court-Decision on Remand

On remand, the district court ordered the CIA to disclose some,
but not all, of the names of the MKULTRA researchers and the insti
tutions with which they had been affiliated. 94 The district court held
that those researchers and connected institutions that had expressly
sought assurances of confidentiality from the CIA could continue to
rely on those assurances. However, the court held that the identity of
those who did not request confidentiality should be disclosed. 95
D.

Court of Appeals-Sims II

Both Sims and the CIA appealed the decision of the district court
on remand. 96 A new and divided panel of the court of appeals held
that the district court had not properly applied the Sims I definition of
"intelligence source" and had interpreted improperly the confidential
91. Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. Chief Judge Markey dissented in part from the majority's decision. Judge
Markey held that the CIA should not be allowed to procrastinate further and withhold the
requested information. Id. at 576 (Markey, C.J., dissenting in part). The CIA was chas
tised by the Judge for attempting to effect an "overbroad" interpretation of section (b)(3).
Id. The court had given the CIA an opportunity to classify the material under section
(b)(1). Id. Judge Markey stated: "It does the Agency no injustice to remark that one who
appears to have thrown down a gauntlet should not be surprised when it appears to have
been picked up." Id. Judge Markey concluded that, where the CIA has not attempted to
meet the guidelines set up by the district court, the case should not be remanded, the dis
trict court's holding in respect to section (b)(3) should be affirmed. Id. at 578.
94. The district court's decision on remand is unpublished. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S.
159, 164 (1985) (the court ordered the names of forty-seven of the researchers released).
95. Id.
96. Sims v. CIA, 709 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984);
467 U.S. 1240 (1984).
92.
93.
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ity issue. 97 In remanding the case for a second time, the court urged
the district court to "begin by defining the type or types of information
provided by the various researchers," and then "determine whether
the CIA could reasonably expect to obtain information . . . without
pledging its providers confidentiality."98 Both the CIA and Sims peti
tioned the Supreme Court for review and the Court granted
certiorari.99
E.

The Supreme Court Decision

A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the CIA that the
MKULTRA researchers and their affiliated institutions were "intelli
gence sources" within the meaning of the National Security Act.lOO
Because the Act mandates that the CIA protect those sources,101 "the
Director of Central Intelligence was within his statutory authority to
withhold the names of the MKULTRA researchers from disclosure
under [section (b)(3)] of the FOIA."lo2 Writing for the majority, then
97. Id. at 99. The majority opinion, written by Judge Edwards, was criticized in the
concurring in part, dissenting in part, opinion of Judge Bork. Id. at 101 (Bork, J., concur
ring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Bork had difficulty with the majority's interpreta
tion of the Sims I decision. Specifically, the Judge disliked the construction that a person
receiving a grant of confidentiality would not be an "intelligence source" if the CIA could
have obtained the same information from another source. Id. at 102.
Judge Edwards countered Bork's reasoning by stating that "there is the serious poten
tial for widespread evasion of the letter and spirit of the FOIA that would be created by the
rule advocated by the dissent." Id. at 99. He also noted that if the Agency felt that the
disclosure of the names of the CIA's sources would jeopardize national security, it could
have withheld them under section (b)(l). Id.
Bork also disagreed with Edward's statement. that "the agency's desire for secrecy
seems to derive principally from fear of a public outcry resulting from revelation of the
details of its past conduct." Id. at 103 (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quoting id. at 101). Observing that news of the MKULTRA experiments already had
been made public and that the release of the names of the researchers would do little to
heighten public concern, he concluded that the CIA had a nobler reason for withholding
the names, such as the promise of confidentiality. Id. at 103. Edwards noted, on the other
hand, that most of the details of the MKULTRA experiments had been destroyed, that the
CIA had refused to act in classifying the identities of the researchers under section (b)(I),
and that some of the details of the experiments suggest that the CIA might indeed fear
public disclosure. Id. at 101 n.l3.
Bork concluded that if he were able, he would adopt a definition of the phrase "intelli
gence sources and methods" that would focus "not solely on the need for secrecy in gather
ing information but also on the need for secrecy about what information is sought." Id. at
103 (Bork, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 100.
99. The Supreme Court granted the CIA's petition in CIA v. Sims, 465 U.S. 1078
(1984) and Sims' petition in Sims v. CIA, 467 U.S. 1240 (1984).
100. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 174 (1985).
101. See supra note SO.
102. Sims, 471 U.S. at 173.
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Chief Justice Burger conceded that "the mandate of the FOIA calls
for broad disclosure of Government records"103 but concluded that
"[t]he plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as the legisla
tive history of the National Security Act ... indicates that Congress
vested in the Director of Central Intelligence very broad authority to
protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure."I04
The Court's affirmance of the CIA's decision to include the
names of MKULTRA researchers and affiliated institutions as CIA
"intelligence sources," protected by the National Security Act and ex
empt from FOIA disclosure, was premised on a fear of CIA disclosure
of any kind. 105 The Court was concerned that public access to CIA
information would chill the Agency's intelligence gathering effective
ness.10 6 Potential intelligence sources would have little faith in the
competence of the judicial system to determine wisely whether or not
to release the name of an intelligence source. 107
The Court in Sims defined an "intelligence source" broadly, as
one who "provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency
needs to fulfill its statutory obligations."lOs Under this definition, the
fact that the researcher provided the CIA with information relating to
the "Agency's intelligence function,"109 and that fact alone, permits
the Director of CIA to prevent disclosure of the researcher's name, 110
regardless of whether an individual researcher was promised
confidentiality.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stated that the major
ity's broad definition of "intelligence source" is "mandated neither by
/d. at 166 (footnote omitted).
104. Id. at 168-69.
lOS. Id. at 173-74.
106. Id. at 174-7S. Chief Justice Burger offered-"[e]ven a small chance that some
court will order disclosure of a source's identity could well impair intelligence gathering
and cause sources to 'close up like a clam.''' Id. at 17S.
107. Chief Justice Burger stated:
We seriously doubt whether a potential intelligence source will rest assured know
ing that judges, who have little or no background in the delicate business of intel
ligence gathering, will order his identity revealed only after examining the facts of
the case to determine whether the Agency actually needed to promise confidenti
ality in order to obtain the information.
Id. at 176.
108. Id. at 177.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Court's definition is not as expansive as the CIA's (see infra note 113),
but it is broader than the court of appeals' and certainly broader than Justice Marshall's.
In order to come under Chief Justice Burger's definition, there must be some relationship
between the source and the CIA and that relationship must be over a national security
issue.
103.
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the language or legislative history of any congressional Act, nor by
legitimate policy considerations, and in fact thwarts congressional ef
forts to balance the public's interest in information and the Govern
ment's need for secrecy." 11 I Characterizing the majority's holding as
"substitut[ing] its own policy judgments for those of Congress"11 2
Justice Marshall supplied an alternative definition of "intelligence
source": those "who contribute[] information on an implicit under
standing or explicit assurance of confidentiality . . . . "113 Believing
that "the exemption [section (b)(3)] protects such information and ma
terial that would lead to disclosure of such information"114 Justice
Marshall argued that only those who were promised confidentiality
should come within the organic statutes.lIS
Justice Marshall also explained that the information sought by
Sims and Wolfe could have been classified pursuant to an executive
order and, therefore, properly withheld under section (b)(l) of the
FOIA.1I6 In fact, he stated that this reading is a true reflection of the
statutory scheme of the FOIA.117
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DEFINITION OF
"INTELLIGENCE SOURCES"

The Sims definition of "intelligence source" as one who "pro
vides, or is engaged to provide information the [CIA] needs to fulfill its
statutory obligations"118 is broad. Anyone who supplies the CIA with
information may be an "intelligence source," whose identity is confi
dential and exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, regardless of
whether the person has requested or been promised confidentiality.119
Although difficult to state with certainty given Congress' imprecision
111. [d. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 193.
113. Id. at 187. Justice Marshall felt that the majority's decision "adopt[ed] whole
sale the Agency's definition." [d. at 182. Justice Marshall's statement is not accurate. The
majority's definition that an "intelligence source" is one who "provides, or is engaged to
provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations" is not the same as
the CIA's definition. Id. at 177. The Agency's definition is as follows: "An 'intelligence
source' generally is any individual, entity or medium that is engaged to provide, or in fact
provides, the CIA with substantive information having a rational relation to the nation's
external national security." Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 576 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1980).
114. Sims, 471 U.S. at 187 (Marshall, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 187.
116. Id. at 188-89.
117. Id. at 188.
118. Id. at 177.
119. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text for the Court's discussion on
the effects of intelligence gathering.
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and ambivalence in the national security area, this broad definition
appears contrary to the information disclosure policies of the
FOIA.120
The facts underlying the Sims litigation do not compel a broad
reading of the term "intelligence source." The researchers were paid
employees rather than volunteers. They were not covert agents oper
ating in the field but were instead researchers in American laborato
ries as much as thirty-three years ago;121 they were certainly not facing
"deadly peril."122
Prior to the litigation, the CIA already had released the names of
many of the researchers and institutions involved in, and various doc
uments pertaining to, the MKULTRA project. 123 Compliance with
the request for information would not realistically have exposed the
MKULTRA researchers to danger,124 nor seriously damaged national
120. See S. REp. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in Freedom ofInforma
tion Source Book: Legislative Materials, Cases, Articles, Subcomm. on Administrative Prac
tice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974)
[hereinafter Freedom of Information Source Book] which states:
It is the purpose of the present bill [FOIA] ... to establish a general philoso
phy of full agency disclosure. . . .
It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, [full government
disclosure v. agency required secrecy] but it is not an impossible one either. It is
not necessary to conclude that to protect one of the interests, the other must, of
necessity, either be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success lies in pro
viding a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all inter
ests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.
Id. See also FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982) ("FOIA exceptions are to be
narrowly construed"); Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)
("these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is
the dominant objective of the Act"); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) ("without ques
tion, the Act is broadly conceived").
121. The courts do not recognize the premise once an intelligence source, always an
intelligence source. Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F. Supp. 704, 719-20 (D.D.C. 1983); Times
Newspapers of Gr. Brit., Inc., v. CIA, 539 F. Supp. 678, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Dunaway v.
Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
122. Sims, 471 U.S. at 187 (Marshall, J., concurring).
123. The CIA has released 40,000 pages of material on its behavior control experi
ments. Copies of the documents are available for inspection at the Center for National
Security Studies. The Freedom of Information Act: Central Intelligence Agency Exemp
tions, Hearings on H.R. 5129, H.R. 7055, H.R. 7056, Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1980). The CIA has been
urged by individual members of Congress to release the names of all of the institutions
involved in the MKULTRA project. Senator Kennedy has stated: "I feel that ... [the
failure to release all of the names of the universities involved] is an incredible disservice to
the innocent individuals and, I think, a disservice to the integrity of the universities unless
they are notified ...." Hearings on Project MKULTRA, supra note 6, at 37.
124. Many of the MKULTRA researchers have not sought confidentiality. Sims v.
CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1980). It is noteworthy that the project ran twenty to

1987]

DEFINING THE CIA'S "INTELLIGENCE SOURCES"

353

security.12S Further, by permitting the CIA to withhold from the pub
lic virtually any information it obtains, the Court's overbroad defini
tion disregards the important public interest in acquiring information
necessary to review the propriety or legality of CIA operations. 126
Given the overall lack of direction by Congress, it is impossible to
prove that the Court's definition incorrectly construed the Congres
sional intent. While its application yields a strained result in the in
stant case,127 one can readily imagine situations where the Court's
analysis would be entirely appropriate. 128 Given the Court's limited
expertise in the national security area, one can understand, if not agree
with, the caution that underlay the Court's deferential definition.
The CIA Act of 1984 would have been an excellent vehicle with
which to resolve the "intelligence source" problem. Congress did not,
however, address the issue or provide the needed clarifying language.
The Court therefore was left largely to its own devices in its attempt to
thirty years ago and is no longer viable. Id. at 563-64. Therefore the effects, if any, of
disclosing the researchers' names would be minimal.
Furthermore, the researchers who sought confidentiality would not face danger under
either Marshall's or the Sims II definition. Marshall's definition calls for withholding the
names of only those sources who request confidentiality. Sims, 471 U.S. at 186 (Marshall,
J., concurring). The definition developed in Sims I and affirmed in Sims II stated that an
"intelligence source" is "a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been
engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its
intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaran
teeing the confidentiality of those who provide it." Sims v. CIA, 709 F.2d 95, 97 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984); 467 U.S. 1240 (1984). Those researchers who
may have felt that they needed confidentiality, and who requested confidentiality, would
have had their identities withheld under either definition.
125. Exposing CIA operatives to danger was a primary concern of the drafters ofthe
CIA Act of 1949. See supra note 58.
126. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
127. The Court's ruling was precedent for the cases to follow, as well as a decision
for the sympathetic plaintiffs in the Sims case. Discussing the complexity of judicial deci
sionmaking and the value of precedents, Justice Cardozo has written that:
It is when the colors do riot match, when the references in the index fail, when
there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business of the judge begins. He
must then fashion law for the litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he
will be fashioning it for others .... The sentence of today will make the right and
wrong of tomorrow.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21 (1921).
128. Assume that the CIA had contracted with a scientist in Vietnam, Iran or Libya
for a number of years for work that was not "intelligence" information, and the researcher
never requested nor even thought of confidentiality. As the political situation changed, it
would be entirely reasonable for the CIA to protect the identity of the researcher. See CIA
v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 177 (1985) ("[D]isclosure of the fact that the Agency [CIA] sub
scribes to an obscure but publicly available Eastern European technical journal could
thwart the Agency's efforts to exploit its value as a source of intelligence information.").
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define "intelligence source."129 This case presents an instance where
all three branches of government-legislative, executive, and judici
ary-avoided making a clear policy choice. While the complex and
varied world of intelligence gathering today130 may make specific
guidelines impractical, greater precision is both warranted and
possible.
IV.

THE COURT'S FAILURE To ASSESS THE VALUE
OF SECTION

(B)(I)

Given the difficulties in deriving a general definition of "intelli
gence sources," the Court could have used section (b)(1) of the FOIA
to provide a sharper, more particularized analysis of the problem
before it. Designed to permit withholding of information properly
classified pursuant to an executive order, section (b)(1) is the "key
stone of a congressional scheme that balances deference to the Execu
tive's interest in maintaining secrecy with continued judicial and
congressional oversight." 131
Judicial review of an agency's classification decision in a section
(b)(l) case is de novo, with the burden of demonstrating proper classifi
cation on that agency. 132 In order to meet this burden, the agency
submits affidavits discussing the nature of the requested documents
and reasons for non-disclosure.133 The court accords these affidavits
"substantial weight"134 when "the description in the affidavits demon
129. Justice Marshall noted the lack of congressional guidance. Sims, 471 U.S. at
187 (Marshall, J., concurring).
130. See generally Laquer, The Future of Intelligence Gathering, Soc. SCI. & MOD.
SOC'Y, Nov.!Dec. 1985, at 3. The Tower Commission (see infra note 146), on the problems
of modern covert operations, stated:
Covert activities place a great strain on the process of decision in a free society.
Disclosure of even the existence of the operation could threaten its effectiveness
and risk embarrassment to the Government. As a result, there is strong pressure
to withhold information, to limit knowledge of the operation to a minimum
number of people.... [I]n many respects the best test of a system is its perform
ance under stress. The conditions of greatest stress are often found in the crucible
of covert activities.
E. MUSKIE, J. TOWER & B. SCOWCROFf, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW
BOARD 11-5 (1987).
131. Sims, 471 U.S. at 183 (Marshall, J., concurring).
132. Baez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(citing Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Hayden v. National Security Agency/Central Security Service, 608 F.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980».
133. Baez, 647 F.2d at 1335 (citing Lesar, 636 F.2d at 481; Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d
1187, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Weissman V. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977».
134. Baez, 647 F.2d at 1335 (footnote omitted).
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strates that the information logically falls within the claimed exemp
tion and [when] the information is neither controverted by contrary
evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith .... "135 If
the affidavits are inadequate, then the court may review the documents
in camera. 136
A section (b)(l) analysis would have illuminated the issues in
Sims. If undertaken, the Court would have seen that the CIA origi
nally classified the names and institutions under this section, but later
chose to declassify them. 137 The Court would have observed further
that the district court gave the CIA the opportunity to reclassify the
material under the relevant executive order 138 and that the CIA chose
not to do SO.139
The section (b)(1) approach to the disclosure of the researchers
would have focused the Court's attention on how the CIA, acting in
accordance with established executive policy, has treated the informa
tion. This approach would have yielded a different result in Sims,
where the Agency itself did not regard the information as classified,
but would protect non-disclosure where the Agency has classified the
documents. More important than the results in any particular case,
however, is that the section (b)(l) approach has the Court and the
executive branch performing more appropriate institutional roles. The
executive branch makes the classification decision, based on its own
expertise and information and in accordance with the procedures and
standards in the executive order. The Court has the more defined and
traditional role of assuring that the CIA followed the proper proce
dure and applied the correct standards.
135. Baez, 647 F.2d at 1335 (quoting Lesar, 636 F.2d at 481; Hayden, 608 F.2d at
1386-87; Ray, 587 F.2d at 1194-95; Weissman, 565 F.2d at 696-98).
136. Baez, 647 F.2d at 1335 (citing Lesar, 636 F.2d at 481; Hayden, 608 F.2d at

1387).
137. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 88 (D.D.C. 1979).
138. Exec. Order No. 12,065,43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978). Sims, 479 F. Supp. at 88.
139. The CIA may have declined to re-classify the material because of the limit on
the duration of the classification order. Normally the duration for classification is six years.
However, when national security requires, the duration will be twenty years with an oppor
tunity for extension. §§ 1-4, Exec. Order No. 12,065,43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978). On the
other hand, the Agency may have declined to classify because it thought that the informa
tion was not classifiable. Section 1-601 of the Executive Order states: "Classification may
not be used to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, to prevent
embarrassment to a person, organization or agency, or to restrain competition." Id. Fur
ther, § 1-602 states: "Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the national
security may not be classified." Id. More probably, the CIA preferred an exemption under
section (b)(3) in order to forgo the procedural requirements established by section (b)(I)
and by the executive order.
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INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT-DoES SIMS
RESOLVE OR HEIGHTEN?

The Court's decision in Sims is both the product of, and a con
tributor to, conflicting views of the decisionmaking process among the
three branches of government 140 with respect to foreign policy issues
in general and "intelligence sources" in particular. This section of the
note argues that the Court is not the proper body to provide the final
definition as to who or what constitutes an "intelligence source."
The legislative branch established a broad information disclosure
policy on the one hand,141 and insulated national security issues and
agencies, on the other.142 The executive branch had at its disposal a
readily available and appropriate solution of classifying information
section (b)(1). Instead of using section (b)(l), it turned to the courts
for a broad definition of "intelligence source" that would exempt the
CIA from most FOIA actions. 143 The Supreme Court, for its part,
gave "great deference"144 to the executive branch and formulated on
its own an extremely broad definition of "intelligence source."145
The executive branch now lacks the incentive to use the more
restrained section (b)(l) for the classification of information. Because
it is intimately involved in sensitive, and at times questionable activ
ity,146 this branch is institutionally biased towards the broadest read
140. See generally Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, The Congress and The
Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1974).
141. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in Freedom ofInformation
Source Book, supra note 120, at 45.
142. For a discussion on the CIA Act of 1984, see supra Section I.C.
143. The CIA's proposed definition of "intelligence source" is "any individual, entity
or medium that is engaged to provide, or in fact provides, the CIA with substantive infor
mation having a rational relation to the nation's external national security." Sims v. CIA,
642 F.2d 562, 576 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1980).
144. CIAv. Sims, 471 U.S. 159,179(1985).
145. Justice Marshall claimed that the Court adopted "wholesale" the Executive
CIA's definition. Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
146. The recent Iran-Contra affair provides an example of the connection between
the White House's National Security Office and the CIA. The New York Times reported
that a Mr. Clarridge of the CIA assisted Colonel North of the NSC "to circumvent the
Congressional ban on aid to the Contras, well before the Administration began its secret
arms deal with Iran ...." Butterfield, Senior Official in C.lA. Is Linked To North's Effort
on Contra Arms, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1987, at AI, col. 6. As a result of the Iran-Contra
affair, President Reagan created a special review board, headed by former Senator John
Tower. The board issued a report which was critical of the way the executive branch han
dled national security issues. Roberts, Tower Panel Portrays the President as Remote and
Confused Man, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at AI, col. 6.
On the CIA's involvement in the affair, the Tower Commission stated:
Some aspects of the Iran arms sales raised broader questions in the minds of
members of the Board regarding the role of CIA. . . . It is critical that the line
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ing of "intelligence source." 147 The Sims definition allows the
executive branch to ignore section (b)(I) and overuse section (b)(3).
The Court's decision can be interpreted as contrary to the tripar
tite of government. Echoing the intentions of the drafters of the Con
stitution,148 Raoul Berger has opposed vesting the executive branch
with complete control over information disc1osure.1 49 The impetus for
establishing the FOIA in 1966 was the fact that the former system had
been used by the executive branch to keep information from the pub
lic. ISO By altering the statutory scheme of section (b)(I), lSI the Court
now allows the CIA to rely solely on section (b)(3).IS2 Ironically, in
relation to national security issues, the Sims decision places the execu
tive in its pre-FOIA position.
Although it should not be so deferential to the executive branch,
neither should the Court be the branch to strike the balance between
between intelligence and advocacy of a particular policy be preserved if intelli
gence is to retain its integrity and perform its proper function. In this instance,
the CIA came close enough to the line to warrant concern.
E. MUSKIE, J. TOWER & B. SCOWCROIT, supra note 130, at V-6.
147.
To the extent that the executive branch has an implied power to maintain
confidentiality, it should be identical to the authority of the judicial and legislative
branches to protect their internal decisionmaking processes. Certainly no branch
of government can perform its assigned constitutional function unless employees
freely voice opinions without fear of external scrutiny. It does not follow, how
ever, that the executive power to maintain secrecy is inherently greater than that
of the two other coordinate branches of government ...."
Dorsen & Shattuck, supra note 140, at 19.
148. "If we advent to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the
people." James Madison, 4 ANNALS OF CONGo 934 (1794) (quoted in R. BERGER, EXECU
TIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 265 (1974». See generally D. HOFFMAN,
GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITU
TIONAL CONTROL (1981).
149. R. BERGER, supra note 148, at 232-34. Berger has testified before Congress a
number of times on the dangers of a too powerful Executive. Contempt of Congress: Hear
ings before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1982); Executive Privilege: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1975); Congressional Review of International Agree
ments: Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs ofthe
House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1976).
ISO. See supra note 18.
151. Justice Marshall, in his concurrence, stated that the majority's holding "enables
the Agency to avoid making the showing required under the carefully crafted balance em
bodied in" section (b)(I). CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 189 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
He reasoned that under Chief Justice Burger's definition, "[0]0 court may consider whether
... information is properly classified, or whether it fits the categories of the Executive
Order. By choosing to litigate under ... [section (b)(3)], and by receiving this Court's
blessing, the Agency has cleverly evaded . . . carefully imposed congressional require
ments." Id. at 190 (footnote omitted).
152. See supra section IV.
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disclosure and secrecy. The Court lacks the expertise to decide com
plex or sensitive foreign policy and national security issues I53 and deci
sions in these cases may involve considerations similar to political
questions. 154 Additionally, the Court's attempt of imposing a defini
tion tends to ignore the statutory framework of the FOIA which was
"carefully crafted" by Congress. 155 Instead of defining "intelligence
sources" under section (b)(3), the more appropriate judicial response
would have been to require the CIA to utilize section (b)(I).
The branch in the best position to strike the appropriate balance
is Congress. 156 In the past, when the Court has ruled on a FOIA is
sue, and when such a ruling was in conflict with the goals of Congress,
that body was willing to amend legislation to effect its policies. 157 As
the source of the FOIA, the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA
Act of 1949 and the CIA Act of 1984, Congress is the branch most
153. Chief Justice Burger stated: "[J]udges ... have little or no background in the
delicate business of intelligence gathering ...." Sims, 471 U.S. at 176.
154. The Court always has been reluctant to become involved in what can be termed
a "political question." Speaking on the role of the Court in such issues, Chief Justice Taney
stated: "And while it should always be ready to meet any question confided to it by the
Constitution, it is equally its duty not to pass beyond its appropriate sphere of action, and
to take care not to involve itself in discussions which properly belong to other forums."
Luther v. Borden 48 (7 How.) U.S. 1, 15 (1849).
Justice Powell outlined factors for determining what constitutes a political question:
(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution
to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that
a court move beyond areas ofjudicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention? Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 966, 998 (Powell, J., concur
ring) (emphasis added).
The Court has viewed many issues in the area of foreign affairs as political questions:
"There are many illustrations in the field of our conduct of foreign relations, where there
are 'considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and certainly, entirely
incompetent to the examination and decision of a court of justice.''' Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 455 (1939) (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 (3 Dall.) U.S. 164,204 (1796». See
generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-20 (2d ed.
1983).
While the definition of "intelligence source" does not present a political question per
se, it does involve similar considerations and such concerns may have influenced the·
Court's decision in Sims.
155. Sims, 471 U.S. at 189 (Marshall, J., concurring); see supra section IV.
156. From the time of the founding of the Republic, when the Court has handed
down a decision contrary to the wishes of Congress, that body has responded with legisla
tion to counter the Courts decision. During the period of 1945-1957 Congress passed new
laws to overrule Court decisions at least twenty-one times. Note, Congressional Reversal of
Supreme Court Decisions, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1336 (1958). Congress twice has
amended FOIA legislation to counter Court decisions that restricted the application of the
Act. See supra note 38.
157. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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responsive to public desire for a more open government. ISS As draft
ers of the legislation which first utilized the term "intelligence source,"
the legislative branch is institutionally best suited to determine its
meamng.
Congress should take the opportunity presented by the over
broad definition established in Sims to clarify the standards for infor
mation disclosure.ls 9 An amendment to the FOIA could change
either section (b )(3), or the definitional section of the Act. l60 Such
amendments, however, may be broader than necessary. The more ap
propriate change would be an amendment to section 403a of the CIA
Act of 1949, "Definitions relating to Central Intelligence."161 A new
paragraph defining "sources and methods" could read:
(d) "Intelligence sources and methods" means any individual, in
stitution, or medium that provides information to the Central Intel
ligence Agency under an express grant of confidentiality when such
grant is necessary to protect the source from danger and is man
dated by the national security.

This proposed definition would give continued protection to those
sources who require it, while providing access to information concern
ing individuals for whom confidentiality is not a necessity. It would
eliminate an unnecessary veil of secrecy over the CIA and subject it to
a proper measure of public accountability, while ensuring those
sources who have requested confidentiality, and who require confiden
tiality, that their identities will not be disclosed.
158. When there was a need for more open access to government, the proponents
went to Congress and not to the executive branch. See generally J. O'REILLY, supra note
20, at §§ 2.01-.06.
159. Congress has been chastised before for its failure to act in information disclo
sure areas. Dr. Harold Cross, whose study on government information disclosure policies
led to the formation of the FOIA states:
Congress is the primary source for relief. In its preoccupation with other
problems it has left the field wide open for executive occupation. The time is ripe
for an end to ineffectual sputtering about executive refusals of access to official
records and for Congress to begin exercising effectually its function to legislate
freedom of information for itself, the public, and the press. The powers of Con
gress to that end are not unlimited but they are extensive.
H. CROSS, supra note 18, at 246 (emphasis in original).
160. This tactic would amend 5 U.S.C. § 552(e), which defines only agency. The
approach would not be new. As recently as the 1984 Freedom of Information Reform Act
Congress proposed that an expanded definitional section be added to the Act. The Freedom
of Information Reform Act Hearings, supra note 48, at 26-28.
161. This section is used as the definitional section for the CIA Act. Section 403a
now defines (a) Agency, (b) Director, and (c) Government Agency. 50 U.S.C. § 403a(a),
(b), & (c) (1982).
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CONCLUSION

By adopting the proposed amendment, Congress would articulate
explicitly an appropriate balance between the National Security Act,
the CIA Acts of 1949 and 1984, and the FOIA. It would define the
information that the public could obtain. The amendment would de
clare to those sources who do not legitimately require confidentiality
that they will not be entitled to it, while continuing to assure to CIA
sources that confidentiality can be obtained if desired.
The Court in Sims had a minimal amount of guidance in formu
lating its decision. The legislative history was sparse and, although the
MKULTRA researchers were far from ideal "intelligence sources,"
the Court clearly felt the need to look beyond the facts of this case and
towards future intelligence disclosure cases. It did so, as the Court
tells us, with great deference to the Agency but also with the realiza
tion that, if it disagreed with the result, Congress would have the op
portunity to create new legislation to reflect its policy. It is clearly
now up to Congress to resolve this information disclosure conflict and
restore the FOIA process.
Jeffrey R. Godley

